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BUILDING EVALUATION INTO 
LANGUAGE1
abstract
In this paper I spell out the conditions for a uniform analysis of thick terms and slurs, presented 
in Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016). Our claim is that thick terms and slurs convey evaluations via 
presupposition and represent a device through which language implicitly conveys linguistically encoded 
evaluations. I introduce the presuppositional account (section 2) and elaborate on the conditions that 
need to be fulfilled for slurs and thick terms to be analyzed along similar lines (section 3). I discuss the 
predictions that this approach offers about the issues of reference and extension (section 4). I conclude 
with some considerations about the role and functions of slurs and thick terms with respect to moral 
systems (section 5).
keywords
evaluatives, presuppositions, reference, slurs, thick terms
BIANCA CEPOLLARO 
Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa)/Institut Jean Nicod (Paris)
bianca.cepollaro@gmail.com
159
BUILDING EVALUATION INTO LANGUAGE
The aim of the present paper is to spell out the conditions for a uniform analysis of thick 
terms and slurs, that represent a device through which language can convey evaluations 
in a way that is linguistically encoded and implicit. In Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) we 
presented a presuppositional account of “hybrid evaluatives”, a class of terms including 
slurs and thick terms. Slurs are usually defined in philosophy of language and linguistics 
as derogatory terms targeting individuals and groups on the basis of their belonging to a 
certain category. Prototypical examples in English are “chink”, “faggot”, “kike”, “nigger”, 
“wop”, etc. Thick terms, on the other hand, have drawn the attention of scholars mainly in 
metaethics rather than philosophy of language and linguistics. They are often introduced by 
means of examples (typically: “chaste”, “courageous”, “generous”, “lewd”, etc.), rather than 
through a canonical definition. Roughly, thick terms are expressions that combine descriptive 
content and evaluative content; unlike slurs, the evaluative component can display different 
polarities (i.e. it can be positive or negative) and they often lack a single-term counterpart: 
their descriptive content usually corresponds to a paraphrase. The main claim put forward in 
Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) is that hybrid evaluatives systematically convey evaluations 
through presuppositions. After briefly introducing the account (section 2), I elaborate on the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled for slurs and thick terms to be analyzed along similar lines 
(section 3) and I discuss the predictions that this presuppositional approach can offer about 
the issues of reference and extension (section 4). In section 5, I conclude by showing how 
the presuppositional account brings up some general considerations about the role and the 
functions of hybrid evaluatives with respect to our moral systems1.
1  I would like to thank the organizers of the San Raffaele Spring School of Philosophy (SRSSP) 2016 on Emotions, 
Normativity, and Social Life for the great event they put together. Thanks to all the participants for their interesting 
talks, stimulating discussion and helpful comments. Thanks also to Claudia Bianchi, Robin Jeshion, Uriah Kriegel, 
Isidora Stojanovic and an anonymous referee for their insightful suggestions. This work was supported by the Labex 




In Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) we analyze slurs and thick terms as belonging to the same 
kind of expressions that we call “hybrid evaluatives”. Our proposal is to treat both of slurs and 
thick terms as presuppositional triggers. Hybrid evaluatives have a descriptive content at the 
level of truth conditions. In the case of slurs, it usually amounts to their neutral counterpart 
(“German” for “boche”, “Jewish” for “kike”, “Italian” for “wop” and so on). For thick terms we 
usually lack a single-term counterpart, but we can formulate a paraphrase for the descriptive 
content. So, for example, the descriptive content of “lewd” is something like “sexually 
explicit”; the descriptive content of “chaste” is “abstaining from sexual relations”, etc. In 
addition to this descriptive content, hybrid evaluatives also convey an evaluative content, 
which we analyze in terms of presuppositions: “wop” presupposes something like “Italians are 
bad for being Italian” and “lewd” presupposes something like “sexually explicit people and 
things are bad for being sexually explicit”, etc.
The main argument in favor of a presuppositional analysis of slurs and thick terms is their 
projective behavior: the evaluative content survives semantic embedding like presuppositions. 
Presuppositions are known for projecting out of certain embeddings, such as negation, 
question, antecedent of a conditional and modal, a.k.a. the S-family (Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet 1990, Simons et al. 2010). The presupposition triggered by “stop” amounts to something 
like (π1) and survives all the following embeddings:
(1) Madonna stopped smoking.
(2) Did Madonna stopped smoking?
(3) If Madonna stopped smoking, it will be good for her health.
(4) Madonna might have stopped smoking. 
π1. Madonna used to smoke.
Thick terms display the same pattern: all these embedded and non-embedded occurrences of 
“lewd” presuppose (π5) (see i.a. Gibbard 1992 and Väyrynen 2009, 2013)2:
(5) Madonna’s show is lewd.
(6) Madonna’s show isn’t lewd.
(7) Is Madonna’s show lewd?
(8) If Madonna’s show is lewd, I wouldn’t like to go to her concert.
(9) Madonna’s show might be lewd.
π5. People and things that are sexually explicit are bad as such.
This projection phenomenon is typically acknowledged also for slurs (see i.a. Croom 2011, 
Richard 2008, Jeshion 2013):
(10) Madonna is a wop.
(11) Is Madonna a wop?
(12) If Madonna is a wop, I wouldn’t like to go to her concert 
(13) Madonna might be a wop.
π10. Italians are bad in some relevant respect because of being so.
The criterion to establish whether an expression counts as a hybrid evaluative or not is the 
following:
2  Examples (5)-(13) are from Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016).
2. A uniform 
analysis of slurs 
and thick terms
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In addition to a descriptive content, hybrid evaluatives systematically convey an 
evaluative content that scopes out when embedded under negation, conditionals, 
modals and questions (Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016). 
One important prediction of the presuppositional account is that when presuppositions 
like (π1), (π5) or (π10) are triggered and are not rejected in a conversation, they become 
common ground. Imagine that in a conversation someone says: “Bianca? She’s a wop”. The 
presuppositional account that I have just sketched predicts that if the participants to such a 
conversation do not protest, they become somehow complicit in the discriminatory attitude 
of the person who uttered the slur. The phenomenon is often label as “complicity” in the 
literature about slurs:
just hearing (…) [the slur ‘nigger’] can leave one feeling as if they have been made 
complicit in a morally atrocious act (Croom 2011: 343).
slurs make recalcitrant hearers feel complicit in the speaker’s way of thinking (Camp 
2013: 333).
In some cases, merely overhearing a slur is sufficient for making a non-prejudiced 
listener feel complicit in a speaker’s slurring performance (DiFranco 2014).
Note that in order to account for complicity, it is crucial to establish what is exactly being 
presupposed; in the literature, two options were put forward, that we can call the “objective” 
and “subjective” option (see Predelli 2010 and Cepollaro 2015). For “wop” and “lewd”, the 
objective and subjective options would be respectively:
(Wo) Italians are worthy of contempt for being Italian.
(Ws) The agent believes that Italians are worthy of contempt for being Italian.
(Lo) People and things that are sexually explicit are bad for being sexually explicit.
(Ls) The agent believes that people and things that are sexually explicit are bad for being sexually 
explicit.
The “subjective” option, proposed in Schlenker (2007) for slurs, has no direct way to explain 
the complicity phenomenon: if the presupposed content is not about targets (Italians, or 
sexually explicit things), but it is about the beliefs of the speaker, it is slightly more difficult 
to explain why the participants to a conversation have any responsibility to say something 
when they do not endorse certain evaluations. On the other hand, the “objective” version 
of the presuppositional account that I favor has a fairly direct answer: if the presupposed 
content is about targets, rather than the speaker’s state of mind, then everyone is somehow 
responsible for the evaluation that is taken for granted. Note however that it is not impossible 
for the “subjective” option to explain complicity. I can think of two lines of explanation, none 
of which I find completely convincing. The first one is to claim that people are in certain 
ways responsible for the beliefs endorsed by the people they deal with; in this sense, avoiding 
challenging the use of a slur would be endorsing the attitude associated to the slur, even if 
all the slur was doing was to inform about the mental state and dispositions of the slur-user. 
The second strategy would be to rely on the notion of “presupposition of commonality”, that 
is, the expectation that the conversation participants are all alike under relevant respects. 
The notion is used by Lopez de Sa (2008: 304) to talk about predicates of taste: “the relevant 
expression (…) triggers a presupposition of commonality to the effect that the participants 
of the conversation are all alike in the relevant respects”. If we admit an extension from the 
taste domain to the moral dimension, we would have the following account: a slur like ‘wop’ 
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activates the presupposition that “the speaker despises Italians qua Italians” and in addition it 
also triggers the presupposition that the conversation participants feel in the same way about 
Italians.
In order for the approach I just sketched to be viable, that is, in order for slurs and thick terms 
to be analyzed along similar lines, a few issues should be settled. I will consider three aspects 
that in my opinion have prevented slurs and thick terms from being treated in the same way: 
(i) the descriptive content of slurs and the notion of “group”; (ii) the wrongness of slurs and 
(iii) the negativeness of slurs. Finally, I will consider what I take to be the relevant differences 
between slurs and thick terms.
(i) The target group
First, I would like to dwell on the notion of “group” that seems to be involved when dealing 
with slurs. We have seen already that slurs are taken to denigrate groups or individuals on 
the basis of their belonging to a certain class. However, scholars do not usually specify what 
counts as a target class; instead, they present some examples involving ethnic or geographical 
origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation. Nunberg (forthcoming) calls these categories “the 
deep fatalities that have historically been the focus of discrimination or social antagonisms 
that we see as rents in the fabric of civil society”. As a result, there is no consensus whether 
certain terms, especially those that are not about the listed typical categories, can count as 
slurs. Take for example “foureyes” for people wearing glasses, or “stinkpotter”, for owners 
of a motorized boat3. Nunberg claims that it was a sign of methodological incuriosity on the 
side of scholars to focus on a restricted set of examples exclusively including the worst slurs 
like “faggot” and “nigger”. Such a restriction put at the center of the debate certain features 
(the unforgivable wrongness and moral sordidness of epithets) that do not seem to necessarily 
characterize slurs as a class.
Someone says “That building is full of flacks [publicists]” or “Mes collègues sont tous 
fachos4”. (…) I don’t think many people would want to argue that those utterances aren’t 
truth-evaluable, or that they’re purely expressive, or that they’re useless5 to us, all claims 
that people have made about words like nigger. Not that the claims about the use of that 
word are wrong—that’s another question—but they seem to apply only to words that 
convey unfounded or indefensible contempt for the members of a racial or ethnic group, 
which make for a poor candidate for a universal linguistic type (Nunberg forthcoming).
I agree with Nunberg on this and my proposal predicts that pejorative terms like “flack” 
for “publicist” and “facho” for “fascist”, just like “foureyes” and “stinkpotter”, can in fact 
count as slurs, even if the categories they target are not prototypical. This brings up a very 
important issue concerning the descriptive content of slurs, namely what categories can count 
as a target group. Scholars have attempted to define what could count as a target group. By 
observing existing slurs in English, we can already discard the hypothesis that for a property 
to determine a target group, there must be some kind of self-identification among the people 
instantiating such a property. It is probably true for properties like “being Italian” or “being 
3  “Sailing enthusiasts deprecate the owners of motor craft as ‘stinkpotters’ but we probably wouldn’t call the word a 
slur” – Nunberg (forthcoming). 
4  In Italics in the original.
5  The allusion is to Hornsby (2001), who talks about slurs as useless words. 
3. Conditions sine 
quibus non
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Jewish” targeted by the slurs “wop” and “kike”, but epithets like “gook” do not involve a 
property with which people can self-identify: “gook” was used to call all natives of the regions 
occupied by the US army (Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans, Filipinos, Vietnam), who do not identify 
with each other (see Jeshion, 2016: 135). Hom and May (forthcoming) have formulated three 
options to establish what counts as a group G, the target of a pejorative:
I) There are no restrictions on G; it can be instantiated by any group whatsoever. This is 
in effect the claim that group membership is not something that is morally evaluable.
II) There is a restriction on G supplied by a theory of natural groups. This theory would 
isolate racial, religious, gender, sexual orientation, etc. as natural groups, and hence as 
targets of pejoration.
III) There is a restriction on G provided by ideologies that are active in sociocultural 
contexts. A group could be a value of G only insofar as there is a discriminatory cultural 
norm that supports it (Hom and May forthcoming).
The authors embrace option (III), while keeping the idea expressed in option (I) that group 
membership is not a morally evaluable feature:
What are the criteria for choices of G such that there will be a pejorative term with 
the meaning (sense) PEJ(G)? – (…) it is reserved for groups that for whatever odious 
reasons have associated with them an unjust, hateful or discriminatory ideology that is 
culturally ingrained within society (Ibidem).
I agree with the authors about rejecting option (II) as a non-starter6, but I do not embrace 
their solution. In my account any property can individuate a target group, as long as there 
are some speakers who find it interesting or relevant to pick out such a property and convey 
an evaluation about the objects instantiating it. Once we admit that the target class of a slur 
could be any (it does not necessarily have to do with nationality, ethnicity etc.), it is easier to 
conceive a unified analysis of slurs and thick terms. Hybrid evaluatives can trigger evaluations 
on any descriptive property, that is instantiated by people or things.
(ii) The wrongness of slurs
Note that in the above discussion about what counts as a target group there is no requirement 
on whether the evaluation is appropriate or not. My criterion to define a slur differs from most 
accounts of slurs in that slurs do not have to be wrong by definition, in the sense that it’s not 
part of how I define a slur that the triggered evaluation is unjust. According to Predelli (2010):
notwithstanding the confused and unpleasant attitude apparently conveyed by uses of 
slurs of that sort (…) racist and xenophobic attitudes are empirically incorrect: there 
is no conceptual (and, more importantly, no meaning-encoded) difficulty in supposing 
that membership in an ethnic or national group provides satisfactory motivation for a 
hostile attitude (Predelli 2010: 180).
And he adds:
6  About the controversial analysis of notions such as gender and race in terms of natural kinds, see i.a. Haslanger 
(2000), Diaz Leon (2012), Spencer (2012).
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It is a lamentable historical accident that bigots and racists have taken the lead in the 
production of ‘lexically encoded’ slurs. Still, exceptions abound: ‘pigs’ may well have 
been an eminently usable derogatory term for typical police officers in the sixties 
(or at least for individuals belonging to certain repressive institutions). Moreover, 
the statistical prominence of racial, sexist, and xenophobic simple English slurs is 
easily compensated by the ‘expressive compositionality’ partially discussed above: 
‘damn fascist’ and ‘fucking racist’ are as subjectively expressive and linguistically 
non-defective as xenophobic slurs, but presumably eminently usable by at least some 
readers of this essay (Ibidem: 184).
I leave room for the possibility that certain hybrid evaluatives might trigger an appropriate 
evaluation; however, this mainly concerns certain non-objectionable thick terms such as 
‘courageous’, presumably not slurs7. So I shall in a sense endorse Hom and May’s claim that 
the properties that slurs pick out are typically not morally evaluable (being Italian, being 
homosexual, etc.), but I do not maintain that it holds for every hybrid evaluative: I am with 
Predelli in saying that the fact that certain hybrid evaluatives (most slurs) target people on the 
basis of incorrect assumptions is a “lamentable historical accident”, not an essential feature 
of evaluatives in general. In other words, it is not essential to slurs that they presuppose unjust 
and unjustifiable evaluations, only that they convey evaluations. In the case of thick terms, 
it is particularly clear that the appropriateness is a variable parameter. As a matter of fact, 
scholars distinguish objectionable and non-objectionable thick terms (Eklund 2011, 2013, 
Harcourt and Thomas 2013, Kyle 2013, Väyrynen 2013): in the former case, speakers endorse 
the conveyed evaluation; in the latter, they do not. 
(iii) The negativeness of slurs
Lastly, slurs do not have to convey a necessarily negative “hateful” evaluation; it’s conceivable 
that a slur might convey an evaluation with a positive polarity. An example of what a slur 
with a positive polarity might look like is “Aryan”: it was used by Nazis to talk about Indo-
Europeans, while conveying some positive evaluation, supporting the idea that being Indo-
European is good in itself. While it is a debated topic for slurs, it is quite clear that thick terms 
can convey a positive evaluation: it is the case for “chaste”, “courageous”, etc. Note that 
the question of polarity is completely orthogonal to the issue of objectability: for example, 
a speaker may well share the negative evaluation conveyed by “brutal” while rejecting the 
negative evaluation conveyed by “lewd” and, on the other hand, one might endorse the 
positive evaluation conveyed by “generous”, but reject the one conveyed by “chaste”. Unlike 
the objectionable/non-objectionable distinction, the polarity of the evaluation is a lexically 
encoded feature, independent of the set of values endorsed by speakers.
In sum, once we acknowledge that the target class of a slur could be any (it does not necessarily 
have to do with nationality, ethnicity etc.), and in principle also the polarity of the evaluation 
could be any and it could be appropriate or not, it is easier to conceive a unified analysis of slurs 
and thick terms. Yet, what needs to be stressed is that slurs are usually both unjust and negative, 
as they typically convey a negative evaluation of their targets on the basis of characteristics that 
in no way ground or justify derogation, exclusion etc. However, I shall underline once more that 
the basic linguistic mechanism through which slurs encode evaluative content does not require 
7  An anonymous reviewer of Phenomenology and Minds has suggested to me a very interesting comparison to the 
possibility for non-verbal pejoration to be morally justified, such as the depiction of the Nazis as pigs in the graphic 
novel Maus by Art Spiegelman. 
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that the evaluation conveyed by the slur is unjust, nor that it is negative.
I take the crucial differences between slurs and thick terms to concern their descriptive 
content. In the case of slurs, the descriptive content amounts to predicates like “Italian”, 
“German”, “homosexual”, etc., that are not typically context-sensitive. In the case of thick 
terms, on the contrary, we find gradable adjectives (see i.a. Kennedy and McNally 2005; 
Kennedy 2007). Take for example “lewd”, that in my analysis would mean something like 
“sexually explicit” while triggering an evaluative presupposition. What counts as “sexually 
explicit” varies from context to context. It is reasonable, for example, to suppose that what 
counts as “sexually explicit” in a monastery is different from what counts as “sexually 
explicit” at a Carnival party: different thresholds on possibly different scales. Such gradability 
of the descriptive content gets inherited by the thick term: a “lewd”-user, namely someone 
who uses the term “lewd”, will apply it or not according to contextually determined 
parameters. On the contrary, slurs tend not to display the same gradability and to typically 
have a simpler and more determined descriptive content.
One of the most debated question for slurs and thick terms concerns reference: to what do 
they refer, if they refer at all? Consider slurs. Take the following utterance:
(14) Bianca is a wop.
Authors like Christopher Hom and Robert May (Hom and May 2013; 2014; forthcoming) 
take slurs to be terms with a necessarily empty extension, as they roughly mean something 
along the lines of “worthy of negative moral evaluation for being G”, where “G” refers to 
a discriminated group (we saw already that for Hom and May belonging to a group cannot 
under any circumstance ground the negative evaluation conveyed by slurs). Hom and 
May (forthcoming) suggest an analogy between slurs and fictional terms. So for example 
“Unicorns are white” is fictionally true, but materially false, whereas “Unicorns do not exist” 
is fictionally false, but materially true. According to them slurs work in a similar way. Suppose 
that the person to which “Bianca” refers is Italian. Compare:
(14) Bianca is a wop.
(15) Bianca is a boche.
In the fiction of racism targeting Italians and Germans, (14) is fictionally true, but materially 
false, whereas (15) is both fictionally and materially false. A problematic prediction of this 
approach is that “Bianca is not a wop” turns out to be necessarily true, whether the subject is 
Italian or not.
Other scholars claimed that slurs refer to the same objects as their neutral counterparts. 
In this case, (14) is true and (15) is false. This view has the controversial consequence that 
(14) turns out to be true, as well as utterances like “Italians are wops”. The defenders of this 
approach advocate for a distinction between a technical sense of “true”, that only involves 
truth-conditions, and a folk sense of “true” that takes into consideration pragmatic factors of 
various kind. In this spirit, “true” should not be confused with “assertable”.
The presuppositional analysis offers a fairly direct answer to questions about reference: hybrid 
evaluatives refer to the same objects as their neutral counterpart, but, being presuppositional 
triggers, they are felicitous only if the evaluation they convey is correct. The presuppositional 
analysis accounts for the following intuition: if one does not endorse a certain moral 
perspective involved by a hybrid evaluative, an utterance featuring the term is not felicitous 
nor clearly evaluable. Consider:




(16) Is Bianca a wop?
(17) Is La vie d’Adele lewd?
A speaker that does not endorse the evaluations triggered by “wop” and “lewd”, would not 
really know how to answer, as both a yes-answer and a no-answer would equally take for 
granted the presupposed content. In order to provide an answer at the descriptive level 
without accepting the presupposition, they might say something like “She is Italian, but there 
is nothing wrong with that” to (16) and something like “It is sexually explicit, but there is 
nothing bad in that” to (17).
Note that it is again crucial what is exactly presupposed here. Recall the two options: the 
“objective” option about the target class (“Italians are despicable because of being Italian”) 
and the “subjective” option about the speaker (“the agent believes that Italians are despicable 
because of being Italian”). I favor the latter, which provides a better account for complicity. 
However, while the “subjective” presupposition is true whenever the speaker truly endorses 
the relevant attitudes, the “objective” option brings up a very complex question: what does 
it mean for an evaluative presupposition to be correct? Presumably, that the evaluation it 
conveys is correct. But how do we establish whether “Italians are bad for being Italians” is 
correct in the context of utterance? The answer to these questions crucially depends on what 
theory of value one favors. One of the most promising approaches comes from the fitting 
attitude theories (FA), that define “good” as “fitting object of a pro attitude” (Ewing 1947: 
152), where “pro attitude” covers “any favorable attitude to something” (Ibidem: 149), such as 
“choice, desire, liking, pursuit, approval, admiration”. Similarly, “(…) what is evil [is] a suitable 
object of anti-attitudes” (Ewing 1939: 9). However, the question of how to establish whether 
certain sentiments of approbation (or reprobation) are warranted remains unanswered and 
it is probably beyond the scope of the present work. For the time being, I will leave this “hot 
potato” to philosophers working in ethics.
Note, though, that these issues do not only concern ethicists, as they have important 
consequences for the theory of presuppositions in general. We say that for an utterance to 
be felicitous, its presuppositions must be true. However, since the presupposition can be 
evaluative rather than descriptive, either we add a clause that says “when the presupposition 
is descriptive”, or we change the truth requirement into something like “appropriateness” or 
“correctness”. Again, we still face the challenge of determining when a certain evaluation 
is correct8. In a nutshell: the interesting difference is between the objectionable and 
nonobjectionable hybrid evaluatives, i.e. between the evaluatives that convey appropriate 
evaluations and those that do not (namely, slurs and objectionable thick terms), rather than 
between slurs and thick terms. The criterion to establish whether a presupposition is correct 
(thus, whether an utterance featuring a hybrid evaluative is felicitous or not), depends on 
what kind of moral theory one endorses, which is still an open question. However, I hope I 
clarified a bit the theoretical options at stake.
Part of the interest for evaluatives on the side of scholars in philosophy of language, linguistics 
and metaethics is due to the peculiar hybrid nature of these terms and to properties such as 
projection and the like. However, a bigger picture emerges from the linguistic analysis of these 
terms that I presented. Something about the function and the potential of hybrid evaluatives. 
As we have seen, my analysis of hybrid evaluatives relies on presuppositions, which are – in 
Chilton’s words – “at least one micro-mechanism in language use which contributes to the 
8  I thank Uriah Kriegel for helpful and insightful discussion about this topic.
5. The big picture
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building of a consensual reality”. By employing these terms, we implicitly take for granted a 
certain moral perspective, certain sets of beliefs concerning what is good and what is bad. We 
implicitly apply a certain lens to the world and expect everyone else to do the same. As we 
noted in discussing complicity, because the presupposed content is presented as not open to 
discussion, if it is not objected it has the potential to shape contexts. In this sense, using hybrid 
evaluatives is a powerful tool through which language not only encodes evaluation, but is also 
able to impose it. Talking about the stereotypes evoked by slurs, Nunberg appeals to the notion 
of “shortcut”: “Stereotypes, negative and positive, are among the cognitive shortcuts we rely 
on to make sense of the world and to guide our responses to it.” I argue that this is true not 
just for stereotypes, but for hybrid evaluatives in general, as they are devices through which 
language can convey evaluations in a way that is both linguistically encoded and implicit.
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